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Many philosophers hold that stakes affect ordinary knowledge ascriptions. Here’s a version of a pair of 
cases aimed at supporting this: Bob and his wife are driving home on Friday and considering whether to 
stop at the bank to deposit a check. The lines at the bank are very long and so Bob considers coming 
back on Saturday. In the low stakes version, nothing of importance hinges on whether the check is 
deposited; in the high stakes version, it is very important that the check be deposited. Bob’s wife asks 
whether the bank will be open on Saturday. Bob says he drove past the bank last Saturday, and it was 
open. However, his wife points out that banks sometimes change their hours. Bob says “I know the bank 
will be open tomorrow”. In the low stakes case, many philosophers maintain that Bob does indeed know 
that the bank will be open; in the high stakes case, these philosophers maintain that Bob is ignorant – 
his statement that he knows the bank will be open tomorrow is false. These philosophers also maintain 
that this pattern of judgments is what we would expect from competent speakers confronted with this 
and similar cases (e.g., Cohen, 1999, 2013; DeRose, 1992, 2009; Fantl and McGrath, 2002; Nagel, 
2008; Rysiew, 2001; Stanley, 2005). 
Though many philosophers agree that stakes play a role in ordinary knowledge ascriptions, there is 
disagreement about what explains this. One view, epistemic contextualism, holds that “to know” is a 
context sensitive verb and that the truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions can vary across 
conversational contexts (e.g., DeRose, 2009). For instance, Bob’s statement “I know the bank will be 
open tomorrow” can be true in low stakes contexts and false in high stakes contexts. Another view, 
 
 
 
 
interest-relative invariantism, denies that “to know” is a context sensitive verb and that the truth 
conditions for knowledge ascriptions vary according to conversational contexts. Instead, cases like the 
Bank cases show that practical factors—i.e., stakes—play a distinctive role in determining whether the 
knowledge relation obtains (e.g., Stanley, 2005). Yet another alternative, which we’ll call classical 
invariantism, denies that “to know” is a context sensitive verb and that practical factors, such as stakes, 
play a direct role in determining whether the knowledge relation obtains. Instead, stakes affect 
knowledge ascriptions only by affecting our assessment of factors that have traditionally been taken to 
constitute or be necessary for knowledge, such as e.g., belief, quality of evidence, etc. (e.g., Bach, 2005; 
Weatherson, 2005; Ganson, 2007; Nagel, 2008). If this is right, then the role of stakes in knowledge 
ascriptions fails to motivate such surprising views as epistemic contextualism or interest-relative 
invariantism. Naturally, epistemic contextualists and interest-relative invariantists deny this, claiming 
that even when the factors that have traditionally been taken to constitute or be necessary for knowledge 
are held fixed, stakes continue to play a role in ordinary knowledge ascriptions (e.g., DeRose, 2009; 
Lawlor, 2013). 
So we see a dispute over what best explains the role of stakes in ordinary knowledge ascriptions. It is 
thus extremely surprising that a wide range of empirical evidence suggests that ordinary knowledge 
ascriptions fail to display any sensitivity to stakes (e.g., Buckwalter, 2010; Buckwalter and Schaffer, 
2015; Feltz and Zarpentine, 2010; May, Sinnott-Armstrong, Hull, and Zimmerman, 2010; Turri, 2017; 
though see e.g., Pinillos, 2012; Pinillos and Simpson, 2014; Sripada and Stanley, 2012). If stakes really 
do not play any role in ordinary knowledge ascriptions, one of the main motivations for epistemic 
contextualism and interest-relative invariantism would be undermined. Perhaps these different 
explanations of the role of stakes in ordinary knowledge ascription are born out of nothing more than a 
myth (Schaffer and Knobe, 2012). If so, classical invariantism about knowledge might be best 
supported—not because it provides the best explanation of the role of stakes in ordinary knowledge 
ascriptions, but rather because the failure of stakes to play a role in ordinary knowledge ascription 
would undercut an important motivation for its two competitors, epistemic contextualism and interest-
relative invariantism. These radical alternatives to classical invariantism, lacking evidence in support of 
one of their important motivations, should perhaps then fall. Classical invariantism would stand. 
In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epis- temic contextualism 
and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether 
there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of 
testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take 
another look at classical invariantism. 
Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous research on stakes. 
Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. 
Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism. 
 
1. Strengthening the Case for Stakes 
The role of stakes in ordinary knowledge ascriptions is taken to be illustrated by patterns of judgments 
allegedly made by competent speakers. While a number of philosophers have taken for granted the 
sensitivity to stakes of knowledge ascription among competent speakers, empirical evidence has 
suggested otherwise. A wide range of empirical research has failed to uncover evidence that stakes play 
a role in ordinary knowledge ascriptions (see below for discussion of evidence seemingly supporting 
such a role). In light of this evidence, it would be tempting to conclude that perhaps stakes do not, after 
all, play a role in ordinary knowledge ascription. As tempting as this may be, however, it seems to us 
that there are a number of issues that have yet to be addressed. 
First, virtually every study exploring the role of stakes in knowledge ascription has failed to ask 
participants whether they view the situation as a high or low stakes situation. This is especially 
surprising given that the main finding is a null result i.e., that knowledge ascriptions do not differ 
between high and low stakes cases. It may well be that the manipulation—i.e., high vs. low stakes—was 
ineffective, perhaps because participants failed to pay sufficient attention to key details varying between 
the cases. For instance, in the Bank cases, it may be that participants fail to appreciate that in one case it 
is “very important” that a check be deposited, while in the other it is “not very important.” If so, then 
 
 
the fact that no stakes effect was found wouldn’t show that competent speakers fail to display a 
sensitivity to stakes. So, in the study reported below, the first question examined whether participants 
have understood what was at stake. 
Another, perhaps more serious issue is that some of the results suggesting that stakes fail to play a 
role in knowledge ascriptions might be due to protagonist projection. Protagonist projection occurs 
when a subject takes up a protagonist’s perspective and imagines what seems true from the protagonist’s 
point of view (Holton, 1997). Importantly, protagonist projection looks to be at least partly responsible 
in producing otherwise surprising findings. For instance, Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001) present 
evidence that Westerners and East Asians view Gettier cases differently: Westerners judge that 
protagonists in Gettier cases do not know the relevant proposition while East Asians judge that 
protagonists in Gettier cases do know the relevant proposition. But recent research suggests that the 
differences uncovered by Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich disappear when taking into account participants’ 
tendency to engage in protagonist projection. Indeed, recent work by Machery et al. (2015) found that, 
across four cultures—USA, India, Japan, and Brazil—rates of knowledge denial when confronted with 
Gettier cases were both high and similar across each of the four cultures sampled when a question 
targeting protagonist projection was introduced. While some participants attributed knowledge to a 
Gettierized protagonist when asked whether that protagonist “knows” or “does not know,” when given a 
question aimed at probing for protagonist projection—i.e., being asked whether the Gettierized 
protagonist “really knew” or “didn’t really know but only thought she knew”—rates of knowledge 
denial increased with the vast majority of participants indicating that the Gettierized subject “didn’t 
really know” but “only thought that she knew” (see also Machery et al. forthcoming). 
Similarly, protagonist projection also looks to be behind apparently non-factive knowledge 
ascriptions such as “Everyone knew that stress caused ulcers, before two Australian doctors in the early 
1980s proved that ulcers are actually caused by bacterial infection” (Buckwalter, 2014, p. 396). It is not 
the case that people accept statements like this because they think that knowledge is non-factive. 
Instead, they accept statements like this because they are engaging in protagonist projection by 
imagining what seems true from the perspective of individuals prior to the discovery that ulcers are 
caused by bacterial infection. 
Recent work by Turri (2017) suggests that something like protagonist projection—what he calls 
“deferral”—may play a crucial role in some of the cases aimed at showing that stakes play a role in 
knowledge ascriptions. Instead of people’s knowledge ascriptions shifting along with variations in 
stakes, people may simply defer to others’ mental-state reports. For instance, in one version of the Bank 
cases (but not in the version we used), the protagonist in the high stakes case says, “I don’t know it will 
be open tomorrow,” while the protagonist in the low stakes case says, “I know the bank will be open 
tomorrow” (see, e.g., DeRose, 2009, 2011). In this version of the Bank cases, agreement with both 
statements might have nothing to do with a shift in stakes. Instead, people may naturally defer to the 
mental state reports of others. 
In addition to producing the misleading appearance of a stakes effect, protagonist projection can also 
mask a genuine stakes effect. This can happen when the protagonist says in both conditions, “I know the 
bank will be open tomorrow,” as is the case in the vignettes we used. To ensure that protagonist 
projection does not mask any genuine effect of stakes, we introduced a probe aimed at capturing 
whether participants are making genuine knowledge ascriptions or merely projecting: It contrasts 
“knows” and “thinks he knows, but doesn’t actually know.” By comparing participants’ answer to this 
probe to their answers to a “know/does not know” probe, we will also be able to examine the role of 
protagonist projection in knowledge ascription in a context where stakes are manipulated. 
Finally, the failure of stakes to play a role in knowledge ascription may only reflect something 
peculiar about the practice of knowledge ascription within a narrow linguistic community. Indeed, all of 
the empirical work done thus far has been conducted with participants drawn from the USA. Perhaps a 
wide range of other linguistic communities display a sensitivity to stakes. So we would like to know 
whether the effect of stakes (or lack thereof) in knowledge ascription is cross-culturally robust. Putting 
all of this together, our questions are: 
• Is the difference in stakes appreciated by participants? 
• Is the lack of a stakes effect due to protagonist projection? 
• Is the effect of stakes (or lack thereof) in knowledge ascriptions cross-culturally robust? 
 
 
 
 
 
In taking these up, our strategy was to undertake a cross-cultural study, introducing a number of 
measures aimed at addressing the questions under consideration in order to determine whether stakes 
sensitivity (or the lack thereof) reflects a core aspect of folk epistemology. 
 
2. A Study in Folk Epistemology 
2.1. Method 
We collected data from 4504 people across nineteen sites, spanning sixteen countries. Each participant 
was randomly assigned to one of two conditions, a low or high stakes version of a Bank case. Here is 
the low stakes version: 
 
Bob and his wife are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They both received some money 
earlier in the day, and so they plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit it. But as 
they drive past the bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on 
Friday afternoons. Although they generally like to deposit any money they receive at the bank 
as soon as possible, it is not especially important in this case that it be deposited right away, and so 
Bob suggests that they drive straight home and deposit their money on Saturday morning. His 
wife says, “Maybe the bank won’t be open tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays.” 
Bob replies, “No, I know the bank will be open. I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday. It 
was open until noon.” As a matter of fact, the bank will be open on Saturday morning. 
 
And here is the high stakes version: 
 
Bob and his wife are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They both received some money 
earlier in the day and so they plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit it. But as they 
drive past the bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday 
afternoons. They have recently written a very large and very important check. If the money is not 
deposited into their bank account before Monday morning, the important check they wrote will 
not be accepted by the bank, leaving them in a very bad situation. Bob suggests that they drive 
straight home and deposit their money on Saturday morning. His wife says, “Maybe the bank 
won’t be open tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays.” Bob replies, “No, I know it’ll 
be open. I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday. It was open until noon.” As a matter of 
fact, the bank will be open on Saturday morning. 
 
To see whether stakes are appreciated, participants were first asked: 
 
Comprehension: According to the story, which of the following statements is correct? [It is not 
very important that Bob and his wife deposit their money/It is very important that Bob and his wife 
deposit their money.] 
 
They were then asked: 
 
Knowledge Attribution: In your personal opinion, when Bob says “I know the bank will be open” is 
his statement true? [Yes, Bob’s statement is true./No, Bob’s statement is not true.] 
And finally to see if responses to Knowledge Attribution are due to protagonist projection, we asked: 
 
Strict Knowledge Attribution: In your personal opinion, which of the following sentences better 
describes Bob’s situation? [Bob knows the bank will be open on Saturday./Bob thinks he knows the 
bank will be open on Saturday, but he doesn’t actually know it will be open.]1 
The cases were translated into fourteen languages by competent native speakers and presented in the 
respective native language for each group. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Demographic Information About the Study’s Participants Who Passed Comprehension Including Countries in Which 
Data Were Collected, Nature of the Sample (Students vs. Non-students) and Mode of Survey Administrations (Paper-pencil vs 
Web-based, Volunteers vs. in Exchange for Compensation, Language of the Survey) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Sample Students Method Payment        Language   N 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Europe 
Bulgaria N Web-based Volunteers Bulgarian 327  
France N Web-based Compensation & volunteers French 367  
Germany N Web-based Compensation German 153  
Italy Y Paper-pencil Volunteers Italian 139  
Portugal Y Paper-pencil Volunteers Portuguese 139  
Spain N Web-based Compensation Spanish 239  
Switzerland N Paper-pencil & web-based Volunteers French 54  
Switzerland Y Paper-pencil & web-based Compensation & volunteers French 30  
UK N Web-based Compensation English 255  
Middle East 
Iran 
 
N 
 
Paper-pencil 
 
Volunteers 
 
Persian 
 
164 
 
Central & North America 
Mexico 
 
N 
 
Paper-pencil 
 
Volunteers 
 
Spanish 
 
133 
 
USA N Web-based Compensation English 225  
South America 
Brazil 
  
Y 
 
Paper-pencil 
 
Volunteers 
 
Portuguese 
 
135 
 
East Asia 
China 
 
Y 
 
Paper-pencil 
 
Volunteers 
 
Chinese, Traditional 
 
128 
 
Guangzhou China Y Paper-pencil Volunteers Chinese, Simplified 109  
Mainland China N Web-based Compensation Chinese, Simplified 180  
Hong Kong Y Web-based Compensation Chinese, Traditional 146  
Japan N Web-based Compensation Japanese 151  
Japan Y Paper-pencil Volunteers Japanese 165  
Mongolia N Paper-pencil Volunteers Mongolian 115  
South Asia       
India Y Paper-pencil Volunteers Bengali 162  
 
2.2. Results 
First, do participants appreciate the difference in stakes? It turns out that they do. Overall, 78% of 
participants passed Comprehension (see Table 1 for Demographics). So we take our first concern—that 
participants may not be appreciating a difference in stakes—to be resolved. 
Next, do stakes affect Knowledge Attribution? Removing participants who failed Comprehension, we 
analyzed responses from the remaining 3530 participants. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Effect of Stakes on Knowledge Attribution for Each Site (* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Sample       N X2      p-value             Cramer’s V 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Central and North America 
Mexico 133 .000 .990 .001  
USA 225 3.661 .056 .128  
South America 
Brazil 
 
135 
 
.318 
 
.573 
 
.049 
 
Europe 
Bulgaria 
 
327 
 
.084 
 
.773 
 
.016 
 
France 367 2.990 .084 .090  
Germany 153 .555 .456 .060  
Italy 139 .117 .732 .029  
Portugal 139 1.229 .268 .094  
Spain 239 6.219 * .161  
Switzerland 84 .841 .359 .100  
UK 255 4.470 * .132  
Middle East 
Iran                                         164 
 
.020 
 
.889 
 
.011 
 
East Asia 
China 
 
128 
 
.522 
 
.470 
 
.064 
 
Hong Kong 146 .272 .602 .043  
Guangzhou China 109 .690 .406 .080  
Mainland China 180 1.345 .246 .086  
Mongolia 115 .003 .959 .005  
Japan 316 5.728 * .135  
South Asia      
India                                          162 1.747 .186 .104  
 
 
More importantly, across sites we find virtually no evidence that stakes affect knowledge attribution 
(see Table 2 and Figure 1). 
Out of the nineteen sites sampled, only three (16%)—Spain, UK, and Japan—displayed a significant, 
small-sized effect of stakes on knowledge ascriptions (the data from the USA is also near significant; 
see Figures 2 and 3). Despite this, a logistic regression model revealed that there was no interaction 
between stakes and site on Knowledge Attribution, which suggests that there is surprising stability in 
the lack of a stakes effect across sites (see Table 3).3 
Moreover, these three linguistic communities, along with every other linguistic community sampled, 
displayed overall high rates of knowledge attribution regard- less of whether the case was low or high 
stakes (Figure 1). These results fit with a range of similar findings4 and extend the finding that stakes 
fail to play a role in knowledge ascription to a range of linguistic communities across the globe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Rates of Knowledge Attribution for High- and Low-Stakes Cases for Each Site 
 
 
Figure 2. Difference Between Low and High Stakes Cases for Those Who Attributed Knowledge on Knowledge Attribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Effect Size (Using Cramer’s V) of Stakes on Knowledge Attribution for Each Site  
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Given that we find virtually no evidence of a stakes effect on Knowledge Attribution, we want to 
know whether this may be due in part to protagonist projection. We look at this in two ways, first, 
using our second measure (“Strict Knowledge Attribution”). Overall, we again find a significant, 
but negligible effect of stakes on Strict Knowledge Attribution (X2(1, 3522) = 10.451, p < .01). 
Ascription of knowledge in the low stakes condition (63%) is only 5% larger than in the high 
stakes condition (58%), and its conventional effect size is tiny (Cramer’s V = .054): Again, on a 
standard interpretation of conventional effect sizes (see Ellis, 2010) it does not even count as small. 
Moreover, across sites, we continue to fail to find evidence of a stakes effect on Strict Knowledge 
Attribution (see Table 4 and Figure 4). 
Indeed, only two linguistic communities (11%)—Germany and USA—out of the nineteen sampled 
displayed evidence of a significant, small-sized effect of stakes on Strict Knowledge Attribution 
(Figures 5 and 6). But despite this, there was no interaction between stakes and site on Strict 
Knowledge Attribution (see Table 5).5 So, on our first way of looking at whether a stakes effect might be 
masked by projection, we find virtually no evidence that stakes affect knowledge attribution. 
On the second way of looking at whether the lack of a stakes effect might be due to protagonist 
projection, we looked at whether there was an effect of stakes on Strict Knowledge Attribution among 
those who attributed knowledge on Knowledge Attribution. Here we find a marginally significant effect 
(χ2(1, 2923) = 3.567, p = .059, Cramer’s V = .035): Of those who attributed knowledge on Knowledge 
Attribution in the high-stakes case, 68% selected “really knows” on Strict Knowledge Attribution; of those 
who attributed knowledge on Knowledge Attribution in the low-stakes case, 71% selected “really knows” on 
Strict Knowledge Attribution. This amounts to a mere 3% difference. 
Yet again, across sites, we continue to find virtually no evidence of a stakes effect on Strict 
Knowledge Attribution among those who attributed knowledge on Knowledge Attribution (Table 6 
and Figure 7). 
 
Table 3. Logistic Regression Results for the Difference in “Knowledge” Answers to Knowledge Attribution between the 
Low and High Stake Conditions (Reference Class: France) (* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001) 
 
 
Sample B(SE) Wald χ2 p-value Exp(B) 
Central and North America 
USA .231(.641) 
 
.130 
 
.718 
 
1.260 
Mexico 
South America 
−.686(.579) 1.405 .236 .503 
Brazil 
Europe 
−.942(.602) 2.445 .118 .390 
Bulgaria 
France (Contrast) 
−.614(.486) 
     — 
1,601 
— 
.206 
        — 
.541 
— 
Germany   −4.12(.553) .556   .456 .662 
Italy −.872(.666) 1.716 .190 .418 
Portugal −1.237(.641) 3.723 .054 .290 
Spain .162(.535) .091 .762 1.176 
Switzerland −1.314(.798) 2.713 .100 .269 
UK .142(.571) .061 .804 1.152 
Middle East     
Iran 
East Asia 
−.740(.535) 1.914 .166 .477 
China 
Hong Kong 
−1.041(.633) 2.706 
.227 
.100 
    .633 
.353 
       .697 −.360(.756) 
.087 .329 
Mainland China .564(.331) .000 .996 .000 
Mongolia −.669(.589) 1.289 .256 .512 
Japan .027(.507) .003 .957 1.027 
South Asia 
India −.077(.621) 
 
.015 
 
.901 
 
.926 
 
 
 
 
On this way of looking at whether a stakes effect might be masked by projection, we find that stakes 
had no significant effect in any site, and approached significance in only two sites: Hong Kong and 
USA (Figures 8 and 9). Yet again, a logistic regression model revealed that there was no interaction 
between stakes and site (see Table 7).6 
Even on our second way of looking at whether a stakes effect might be masked by projection, we 
continue to find virtually no evidence that stakes affect knowledge attribution. We conclude that the 
lack of a stakes effect on knowledge ascriptions cannot be dismissed by appealing to protagonist 
projection. 
 
 
Table 4. Effect of Stakes on Strict Knowledge Attribution for Each Site (* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Sample N χ2 p-value Cramer’s V 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Central and North America 
Mexico 131 1.740 .187 .115  
USA 225 5.453 * .156  
South America 
Brazil 
 
135 
 
2.603 
 
.107 
 
.139 
 
Europe 
Bulgaria 
 
327 
 
.248 
 
.618 
 
.028 
 
France 365 .505 .477 .037  
Germany 151 3.860 * .160  
Italy 139 .024 .878 .013  
Portugal 139 .033 .856 .015  
Spain 239 1.930 .165 .090  
Switzerland 84 .350 .554 .065  
UK 252 2.640 .104 .102  
Middle East 
Iran                                            164 
 
2.159 
 
.142 
 
.115 
 
East Asia 
China 
 
128 
 
2.092 
 
.148 
 
.128 
 
Hong Kong 146 2.776 .096 .138  
Guangzhou China 109 .002 .969 .004  
Mainland China 180 .479 .489 .052  
Mongolia 116 .556 .456 .069  
Japan 316 2.988 .084 .097  
South Asia      
India                                             162 .144 .704 .030  
 
 
2.3. Discussion 
Given these results and the wide swath of research indicating that stakes do not play a role in ordinary 
knowledge ascription, the scales tilt against epistemic con- textualism and interest-relative invariantism, 
at least to the extent that they attempt to account for everyday knowledge ascription. One of the 
important motivations for these views—that stakes play a role in ordinary knowledge attributions—is 
undermined. These views are “idle hypotheses” (Turri, 2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Rates of Strict Knowledge Attribution for High and Low Stakes Cases for Each Site 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Difference Between Low and High Stakes Cases for Those Who Selected “Really Knows” on Strict Knowledge 
Attribution for Each Site 
 
 
Interestingly, stakes had a marginally significant effect on both Knowledge Attribution and Strict 
Knowledge Attribution among those who attributed knowledge on Knowledge Attribution for the USA 
sample. Stakes also had a significant, but small effect for the Strict Knowledge Attribution question. 
Perhaps this explains why some epistemologists who have alleged there is a stakes effect, the most 
influential of whom are Americans, thought there was a stakes effect. In any case, the small effect of 
stakes is a far cry from what we would expect if stakes played an important role in knowledge 
ascription. On the whole, we find that there is surprising stability in the lack of a stakes effect on 
knowledge ascriptions across cultures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Effect Size (Using Cramer’s V) of Stakes on Strict Knowledge Attribution for Each Site 
 
3. Objections and Responses 
3.1. Evidence for a Stakes Effect 
Some experimental studies claim to have found some evidence for a stakes effect (Pinillos, 2012; 
Sripada & Stanley, 2012). These results clearly conflict with our findings as well as a range of other 
research. So perhaps there really is a genuine stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. 
We are skeptical that these studies provide genuine evidence that there is a stakes effect on ordinary 
knowledge ascription. Pinillos (2012) gave people a case about an individual, Peter, writing a paper for 
an English class. In the low stakes version, it is not very important whether the paper has typos; in the 
high stakes version, it is very important that the paper not have typos. Pinillos found that when 
participants were asked, “How many times do you think Peter has to proofread his paper before he 
knows that there are no typos?”, the median response was 2 in the low stakes version while the median 
response was 5 in the high stakes version. Pinillos interprets this as evidence that stakes do indeed affect 
ordinary knowledge ascriptions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Logistic Regression Results for the Difference in “Knowledge” Answers to Strict Knowledge Attribution between 
the Low and High Stake Conditions (Reference Class: France) (* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But Buckwalter (2014) and Buckwalter and Schaffer (2015) present compelling evidence that the 
effect Pinillos found has nothing to do with knowledge. The effect persists when “knows” in the probe 
Pinillos used is replaced with “believes,” “guesses,” and “hopes.” Rather than being an effect on 
knowledge ascription, the stakes effect Pinillos has uncovered is instead an effect on the modal 
expression “has to” (Buckwalter and Schaffer, 2015). 
In Sripada and Stanley (2012), participants read about an individual, Hannah, who is allergic to 
Mongolian pine nuts. She is having dinner at a Mongolian restaurant, and the possibility is raised 
that there may be Mongolian pine nuts in her dish. They found an effect of stakes on knowledge 
ascription in two separate pairs of cases. However, the effect looks to be quite small in both cases (less 
than a 1 point scale difference on a 7 point scale).7 Moreover, when inspecting the graphs of their results 
(2012, 15), the mean responses in both the low and high stakes version for both pairs of cases do not 
seem to be significantly different from the midpoint of “neutral.” That is, in the cases used by Sripada 
and Stanley, participants are actually neutral about whether to ascribe knowledge in both the high and 
low stakes versions of these cases. Stakes may have an effect, a small one at that, only when people are 
uncertain about ascribing knowledge. We doubt that these results are very encouraging to proponents of 
epistemic contextualism and interest relative invariantism since “[t]hey remain a far cry from the strong 
flip from “knowledge” to “ignorance” which DeRose, Stanley and many other epistemologists had 
predicted from the armchair . . . ” (Buckwalter and Schaffer, 2015, 221). Moreover, there is good 
empirical reason for thinking that the “stakes effect” Sripada and Stanley claim to have uncovered is 
confounded with salience and that the effect is instead a salience effect and not a stakes effect (see 
Buckwalter and Schaffer, 2015). 
 
Sample B(SE) Wald χ2 p-value Exp(B) 
Central and North America 
USA .477(.375) 
 
1.621 
 
.203 
 
1.611 
Mexico .330(.458) .519 .471 1.390 
South America 
Brazil 
Europe 
−.769(.445) 
 
2.990 
 
.084 
 
.464 
Bulgaria 
France (Contrast) 
−.061(.339) 
— 
.032 
— 
.857 
— 
.941 
— 
Germany 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
Switzerland 
UK 
.539(.443) 
−.122(.429) 
−.111(.437) 
   .187(.360) 
   .090(.514) 
   .248(.360) 
1.483 
.081 
.064 
.269 
.031 
.473 
.223 
.776 
.800 
.604 
.861 
.492 
1.715 
.885 
.895 
1.206 
1.094 
1.281 
Middle East 
Iran 
 
−.640(.402) 
 
2.535 
 
.111 
 
.528 
East Asia 
China 
Hong Kong 
Guangzhou China 
Mainland China 
Mongolia 
Japan 
 
.364(.449) 
.450(.452) 
−.191(.459) 
−.504(.536) 
−.481(.480) 
.334(.387) 
 
.656 
.991 
.173 
.884 
1.009 
.747 
 
.418 
.320 
.677 
.347 
.315 
.387 
 
1.438 
1.568 
.826 
.604 
.618 
1.397 
South Asia 
India 
 
−.050(.415) 
 
.014 
 
.905 
 
.952 
 
 
 
Table 6. Effect of Stakes on Strict Knowledge Attribution Among Those Who Attributed Knowledge on Knowledge 
Attribution (* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Sample N χ2 p-value Cramer’s V 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Central and North America 
Mexico 92 1.448 .229 .125 
USA 202 3.182 .074 .126 
South America 
Brazil 
 
110 
 
2.303 
 
.129 
 
.145 
Europe 
Bulgaria 
 
245 
 
.056 
 
.812 
 
.015 
France 333 .003 .995 .003 
Germany 109 1.351 .245 .111 
Italy 122 .095 .758 .028 
Portugal 120 .650 .420 .074 
Spain 190 .297 .586 .040 
Switzerland 74 .724 .395 .099 
UK 218 1.327 .249 .078 
Middle East 
Iran 118 
 
2.013 
 
.156 
 
.131 
East Asia 
China 
 
107 
 
.613 
 
.434 
 
.076 
Hong Kong 134 3.581 .058 .163 
Guangzhou China 90 .356 .551 .063 
Mainland China 179 .210 .617 .034 
Mongolia 80 1.074 .300 .116 
Japan 249 .034 .854 .012 
South Asia     
India                                       139 .416 .519 .055 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Rates of Strict Knowledge Attribution for High and Low Stakes Cases Among Those Who Attributed 
Knowledge on Knowledge Attribution for Each Site 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2. The Role of Linguistic Evidence 
Proponents of contextualism or interest-relative invariantism may object that their theories are not 
meant to account for everyday knowledge ascriptions. They are, after all, theories of knowledge, rather 
than linguistic theories about “to know.” 
We have two brief responses to this concern. To the extent that contextualism and interest-relative 
invariantism are not meant to account for knowledge ascriptions—perhaps they are theories of 
knowledge to be developed largely independently  of how people talk about knowledge and what they 
think about it—then, we acknowledge, our findings have little to say about contextualism and interest-
relative invariantism. They are only relevant for those philosophical views that aim at accounting for 
everyday knowledge ascription. 
We add that as a matter of fact, many contextualists and interest-relative invariantists propose to 
account for everyday knowledge ascription. DeRose (1992) formulates contextualism as a semantic 
theory and he engages with the early experimental philosophy literature on stakes effects in bank cases 
(2011). Moreover DeRose (2009) is explicit that “[t]he best grounds for accepting contextualism comes 
from how knowledge-attributing (and knowledge-denying) sentences are used in or- dinary, non-
philosophical talk: What ordinary speakers will count as ‘knowledge’ in some non-philosophical 
contexts they will deny is such in others” (p. 47). Ludlow (2005, 11) too explicitly formulates 
contextualism as a semantic thesis: “According to the thesis of contextualism in epistemology, many of 
our knowledge attributions (including self-attributions) are context sensitive.” 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Difference Between Low and High Stakes Cases for Those Who Selected “Really Knows” on Strict Knowledge 
Attribution Among Those Who Attributed Knowledge on Knowledge Attribution for Each Site  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Effect Size (Using Cramer’s V) of Stakes on Strict Knowledge Attribution Among Those Who Attributed 
Knowledge on Knowledge Attribution for Each Site 
 
Table 7. Logistic Regression Results for the Difference in “Knowledge” Answers to Strict Knowledge Attribution among those 
that Attributed Knowledge on Knowledge Attribution between the Low and High Stake Conditions (Reference Class: France) 
(* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________ 
 
3.3. A Negative Result Limited to the Bank Cases 
One might argue that our results merely show that the bank cases are inappropriate to elicit a stakes 
effect, not that there is no stakes effect. Other cases would elicit a stakes effect. However, the bank 
cases were put forward by some advocates of the view that stakes affect ordinary knowledge 
Sample B(SE) Wald χ2 p-value Exp(B) 
Central and North America 
USA .523(.417) 
 
1.572 
 
.210 
 
1.688 
Mexico .570(.568) 1.009 .315 1.769 
South America     
Brazil 
Europe 
−.613(.488) 1.577 .209 .542 
Bulgaria .048(.393) .015 .903 1.049 
France (Contrast) — — — — 
Germany .641(.640) 1.004 .316 1.899 
Italy .102(.477) .046 .831 1.107 
Portugal .329(.516) .407 .524 1.389 
Spain .147(.413) .126 .723 1.158 
Switzerland .415(.583) .506 .477 1.514 
UK .317(.407) .606 .436 1.373 
Middle East     
Iran 
East Asia 
−.544(.470) 1.337 .248 .580 
China .309(.504) .374 .541 1.361 
Hong Kong .776(.551) 2.301 .129 2.173 
Guangzhou China .248(.528) .221 .638 1.282 
Mainland China 
Mongolia 
−.239(.565) 
−.500(.549) 
.178 
.829 
.673 
.363 
.788 
.607 
Japan .058(.493) .014 .906 1.060 
South Asia 
India −.274(.492) 
   
.760 
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
ascriptions as being the best cases for eliciting a stakes effect (Buckwalter and Schaffer, 2015, 222). 
Furthermore, even Sripada and Stanley, who think that their pine nut cases are the best cases for 
eliciting a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription, find at best a very small effect of stakes, 
which shifts people from being slightly more to slightly less neutral about whether to ascribe knowledge. 
Finally, other studies have used a range of cases with each failing to uncover an effect of stakes on 
ordinary knowledge ascription (see e.g., Feltz and Zarpentine, 2010; Turri, 2017; Turri and Buckwalter, 
2017). Indeed, in light of our findings and a range of research failing to uncover a stakes effect in 
ordinary knowledge ascriptions, we think that stakes fail to reflect a core aspect of folk epistemology. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Epistemic contextualists hold that knowledge ascription shifts across conversational contexts; interest-
relative invariantists recognize a distinctive epistemic role for practical factors such as stakes in 
knowledge ascription. If either of these is correct, serious pressure is put on classical invariantism since 
the classical invariantist rejects both claims. However, a wide range of empirical evidence now suggests 
that stakes do not play any role in ordinary knowledge ascription. 
We set out to provide what we take to be a stringent test of whether stakes play a role in ordinary 
knowledge ascriptions. In doing so we pursued three main questions: 
• Is the difference in stakes appreciated by participants? 
• Is the lack of a stakes effect due to protagonist projection? 
• Is the effect of stakes (or lack thereof) in knowledge ascriptions cross culturally robust? 
 
Our results indicate that subjects do indeed appreciate the difference in stakes, that a stakes effect is not 
being masked by protagonist projection, and that the lack of a stakes effect in ordinary knowledge 
ascription is cross-culturally robust. In light of our evidence and a wide range of previous empirical 
findings on the role of stakes in knowledge ascription, one of the core motivations for epistemic 
contextualism and interest relative invariantism is undercut. Although we won’t defend this claim in 
detail here, we conclude that classical invariantism should be taken seriously, now that its challengers 
have been undermined.8 
 
Notes 
1 There was a slight difference in the translation of this question in the low and high stakes cases for 
the Japanese version. The low stakes version read as reported above but the high stakes version used, 
“Of the following two sentences, which do you think better describes Takeshi’s situation?”. 
2 We follow Ellis (2010) in interpreting the magnitude of the effect sizes. For Cramer’s V we 
interpret values greater than or equal to .5 as large, greater than or equal to .3 but less than .5 as 
medium, and greater than or equal to .1 but less than .3 as small. 
3 A logistic regression model with stakes, site, and an interaction between stakes and site on 
Knowledge Attribution was run. Stakes did not predict Knowledge Attribution, Wald χ2 = 2.897, p = 
.089; site significantly predicted Knowledge Attribution, Wald χ2 = 65.376, p = .000; and, using France 
as the contrast class, there was no significant interaction between stakes and site on Knowledge 
Attribution, Wald χ2 = 22.314, p = .218. 
4 See e.g., Buckwalter, 2010; Buckwalter and Schaffer, 2015; Feltz and Zarpentine, 2010; May, 
Sinnott-Armstrong, Hull and Zimmerman, 2010; Turri, 2017. 
5 A logistic regression model with stakes, site, and an interaction between stakes and site on Strict 
Knowledge Attribution was run. Stakes did not predict Strict Knowledge Attribution, Wald χ2 = .505, p 
= .478; site significantly predicted Strict Knowledge Attribution, Wald χ2 = 139.090, p = .000; and, 
using France as a contrast class, there was no significant interaction between stakes and site on Strict 
Knowledge Attribution, Wald χ2 = 22.071, p = .223. 
6 A logistic regression model with stakes, site, and an interaction between stakes and site was run. 
Among those who attributed knowledge on Knowledge Attribution, Stakes did not predict Strict 
Knowledge Attribution, Wald χ2 = .003, p = .955; site significantly predicted Strict Knowledge 
Attribution Wald χ2 = 99.536, p = .000; and, using France as a contrast class, there was no significant 
 
 
interaction between stakes and site on Strict Knowledge Attribution Wald χ2 = 17.307, p = .502. 
7 We say it “looks” small because we can’t actually calculate the effect size since Sripada and 
Stanley do not report means and standard deviations. 
8 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for helpful suggestions. This publication was 
made possible through the support of a grant from the Fuller Theological Seminary / Thrive Center 
in concert with the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Fuller Thrive Center or the John 
Templeton Foundation. 
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